Infighting over the succession and growing frustration in the regions could shatter the stability that the Tajik president has been building for so many years.

Next year will mark thirty years of Emomali Rahmon’s presidency in Tajikistan, now the only country in Central Asia that has not seen a change of leadership since the early 1990s. Unsurprisingly, there have been rumors of an imminent transition of power for a decade.

The name of the successor is no secret: it’s Rahmon’s son, thirty-six-year-old Rustam Emomali. But there is no consensus within the president’s large family over the succession. Some of the president’s other children have their own ambitions to run the country, which could upset plans for the transition.

President Rahmon is seventy-one years old, and has reportedly suffered numerous health issues. Arrangements for the transition have long been in place, but events keep getting in the way of its implementation: first the pandemic and its economic fallout, and then the street protests in neighboring Kazakhstan in January 2022, which frightened the Tajik leader and persuaded him it was not a good time to step down. Even Turkmenistan has seen a power transition in recent years. Now Tajikistan is expected to implement its own in 2024.

Rustam has already headed a number of government agencies. Since 2017, he has been mayor of Dushanbe: a post he has combined since 2020 with that of speaker of the upper house of parliament, to whom power would automatically pass if the current president were to step down early.

His supporters argue that as the capital’s mayor, he has improved the city, supported youth initiatives, and started to form his own team of young technocrats. Some are counting on him to carry out at least limited reforms once he is in power, such as those seen in neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Not everyone believes Rustam is ready to take over, however. The future president is an unknown quantity for most Tajiks. All of his public appearances are prerecorded and accompanied by information read out by the broadcaster, meaning that people have not even heard him speak. His nickname on social media is “the great mute.”

More worryingly, the heir apparent has reportedly shot and wounded two people: his own uncle in 2008, and—just last year—the head of the State Committee for National Security, Saimumin Yatimov, supposedly for refusing to carry out orders.

There are those within the presidential family who do not want to see Rustam succeed his father because they fear losing prestigious posts in government and business. They are indignant that there are no relatives within the team he is building. The current president cannot possibly keep everyone happy, and this could threaten the transition, as ambitious clan members prepare to battle it out for the top job in order to retain their privileges.

Rahmon has seven daughters and two sons. The most ambitious of them is generally considered to be the second daughter Ozoda, who has headed up the presidential administration since 2016. She is very experienced, works well with her staff, and has the trust of the security services. Unsurprisingly, given the alleged shooting incident, there is no love lost between Rustam and the country’s main security official Yatimov, who has reportedly been paving the way for Ozoda’s candidacy. In addition, her husband Jamoliddin Nuraliev is also considered a very influential figure, having been deputy chair of the country’s central bank for over seven years.

Another contender for the presidency could be Rahmon’s fifth daughter, Ruhshona, a seasoned diplomat who is well versed in Tajikistan’s political affairs. Her husband is the influential oligarch Shamsullo Sohibov, who made his fortune thanks to his family connection to the president. Together with his brothers, he controls entire sectors of the economy, including transport, media, and banking. Change at the top could deprive the Sohibov clan of both influence and money, so Ruhshona and her husband may well throw their hats into the ring.

They might get the backing of Rahmon’s other children, who also control various sectors of the economy, including air travel (the third daughter, Tahmina) and pharmacies (the fourth daughter, Parvina). There are also plenty of Rahmon’s more distant relatives who owe their fortunes to the president and fear losing their positions under his successor.

Rahmon has relied on the loyalty of various relatives to ensure the stable functioning of his regime. But overly vociferous squabbles within the family could destabilize the situation, and for precisely this reason, Rahmon has tried to temper their ambition. Ruhshona, for example, was sent to the UK as Tajik ambassador to stop her from interfering in the plans for the transition. Her oligarch husband went with her.

Nor is the heir apparent himself outside the fray. There is evidence that Rustam was involved in leaking information to the media about his sister Ozoda’s alleged affair with her driver: something that, in patriarchal Tajikistan, caused serious damage to her reputation. There are also rumors that Ozoda’s main ally Yatimov will be retired from his post as head of the security services and replaced with a close friend of Rustam, Shohruh Saidov.

Right now, international circumstances are conducive to a swift transition. Tajikistan’s relations with its trickiest neighbors, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, are improving. While the Taliban has yet to be recognized as the legitimate Afghan government by Dushanbe, both sides agreed to strengthen economic ties during the first visit to Tajikistan by a delegation from the radical Islamist movement in March this year. Meanwhile, the Tajik government has pledged to resolve the border dispute with Kyrgyzstan—an issue that has led to several armed clashes in the last three years—by spring 2024. Rahmon is clearly trying to hand over a stable country to his son.

The situation at home, however, is more complicated. There is also considerable opposition to Rustam’s candidacy among the regional elites, who have long supported Rahmon in exchange for access to state resources, and are now seeing many of the most lucrative cash flows appropriated by the presidential family. A transition of power could be an opportune moment to express their displeasure.

Events in Gorno-Badakhshan in spring 2022 were a stark warning of the dangers of that displeasure. After the civil war that ravaged the country in the early 1990s, many of its field commanders settled in the region. Over time, they became informal leaders of the local communities, helping to solve problems that the central government was ignoring, sometimes strong-arming local officials into making the required decision. Rahmon ordered several security operations to rid Gorno-Badakhshan of this dual power system, only for it to reemerge further down the line.

Last spring, protests erupted there after a local man was killed by law enforcement officers. The unrest lasted for several months until Rahmon crushed it by force. Many of the activists were killed or imprisoned, while others fled the country, and the region was brought back under Dushanbe’s control. But the anger simmering in the region could boil over again at the first sign of conflict.

For now, the other regions remain loyal to the regime, but that could change after the power transition if the local elites feel they are not getting sufficient state resources.

By directing all the streams of income and control of the country to his own relatives, Rahmon has painted himself into a corner. Infighting over the succession and growing frustration in the regions could shatter the stability that the president has been building for so many years. Power transitions rarely go to plan in Central Asia, and Tajikistan may be no exception.

Source

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President Kassym-Joomart Tokayev approved the new government of Kazakhstan under the leadership of Olzhas Bektenov. The names of the ministers were published on primeminister.kz.

Most of the ministers remained from the old government.

Four ministers were replaced: Nurlan Baibazarov was appointed Deputy Prime Minister – Minister of National Economy instead of Alibek Kuantyrov, Madi Takiyev became Minister of Finance instead of Erulan Zhamaubaev, Akmaral Alnazarova was appointed Minister of Healthcare instead of Azhar Giniyat, and Chingis Arinov became the new Minister for Emergency Situations instead of Syrym Shariphanov.

Members of the government who remained in their positions included First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar, Minister of Foreign Affairs Murat Nurtleu, Chief of Staff of the Government Galymzhan Koishybayev, Deputy Prime Minister Tamara Duisenova, Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, Minister of Defense Ruslan Zhaksylykov, Minister of Internal Affairs Yerzhan Sadenov, Minister of Justice Azamat Yeskarayev, Minister of Energy Almassadam Satkaliyev, Minister of Agriculture Aidarbek Saparov, Minister of Digital Development, Innovation and Aerospace Industry Bagdat Mussin, Minister of Education Gani Beisembayev, Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources Yerlan Nyssanbayev, Minister of Science and Higher Education Sayasat Nurbek, Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Nurzhan Nurzhigitov, Minister of Culture and Information Aida Balayeva, Minister of Tourism and Sports Yermek Marzhikpayev, Minister of Transport Marat Karabayev, Minister of Labour and Social Protection of the Population Svetlana Zhakupova, Minister of Industry and Construction Kanat Sharlapaev, and Minister of Trade and Integration Arman Shakkaliyev.

There are currently 26 members of the government. The composition was renewed for 16%. There are six deputy prime ministers left. 16% remained women.

President Kassym-Joomart Tokayev decided to resign the government of Kazakhstan on February 5. The duties of the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan were temporarily assigned to Roman Sklyar. The next day, the president said the government’s resignation was aimed at providing new impetus and meeting public expectations. In addition, the president promised that the new government will use new approaches.

The head of the Presidential Administration of Kazakhstan, Olzhas Bektenov, headed the government of Kazakhstan on February 6. His candidacy was proposed by the Amanat party, it was supported by the president, the majority of factions of political parties in the Parliament agreed to the appointment. Olzhas Bektenov replaced Alikhan Smailov, who had headed the Cabinet of Ministers since January 2022.

Source: Akipress

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Budapest (12/8 – 33)

Mahmadzohir will theoretically be eligible to run for president in 2027.

In Tajikistan, only the president is permitted to enjoy an unfettered public profile. An intriguing exception to this norm is emerging, however, with another figure amassing huge levels of apparent popularity and prominence. This person too is a member of the ruling family.

Ismoil Mahmadzohir, who turned 26 last month, is the grandson of President Emomali Rahmon. His mother, Firuza, is one of Rahmon’s seven daughters. He attended the Elite British Prep School Queen Ethelburga’s College and is the CEO of IM Group.

Ismoil Mahmadzohir is born on July 11, 1997. He is son to Mahmadzoir Sokhibov and President Rahmon’s daughter, Firuza Imomali. Nephew of Shamsullo Sokhibov and Rukhshona. He is the CEO of IM Group. He has served as president of the Judo Federation of Tajikistan.

Mahmadzohir – a visually distinctive character on account of his moustache; not a popular fashion choice in Tajikistan – owes his recognizability to a considerable extent to Instagram, where he has 2 million followers. Each post generates hundreds of likes and comments. Mahmadzohir describes himself in English on the platform as an entrepreneur, athlete, and a philanthropist.

Instagram reveals the young man to have a fondness for luxury cars, of which he owns dozens. One is appointed with the vanity plate number 1111. While his videographer films him in designer clothing and riding a gleaming black stallion, he pretends to play buzkashi, a highly rough-and-tumble horse-riding competition in which two teams fight for possession of a headless goat.

Mahmadzohir’s many Instagram accounts,

• https://www.instagram.com/ismoil8/
• https://www.instagram.com/rayison_tj/
• https://www.instagram.com/buzkashi_1111/

There is a more formal, workman-like aspect to Mahmadzohir’s activities too. Since November, he has served as president of the Judo Federation of Tajikistan. In May, Dushanbe hosted the 2023 Judo Grand Prix, an event that serves as a stepping stone to qualification for the Olympics. The event attracted a certain level of positive international media attention for Tajikistan, which tends to mainly make the news for its mass corruption and ongoing human rights abuses.

Mahmadzohir is not reticent in trumpeting his charitable works either. Last year, he reportedly paid for villagers in the Khuroson District, in southern Tajikistan, to be connected to the water supply grid. As a result, around 3,000 people received access to safe drinking water. Nobody appears to have questioned why the government didn’t do this earlier. Visits to orphanages do not go unnoticed.

Mahmadzohir is likewise eager to publicize his pious credentials. In 2021, he paid for 20 low-income families to perform the hajj to Mecca. News about this was shared on Instagram.

None of this is to say he purports to be modest in his tastes and spending abilities. His Instagram feed is littered with images of trips to places like France, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and Austria. He likes nowhere better than the United Arab Emirates though. There, he befriended his “brother”, Osama Ahmad Abdullah Al Shafar, president of the UAE Cycling Federation, VP Of Union Cycliste Internationale, and member of the 4 person Dubai Federal National Council.

_{Above pictures: Al Shafar (in white) and Ismoil Mahmadzohir
Source –https://www.instagram.com/p/CLrQB1PnCmS}

Mahmadzohir has taken a strong lead in trying to popularize Tajikistan’s tourism appeal as well.

In April, Mahmadzohir organized for mega-popular Russian video blogger Gusein Gasanov to visit Tajikistan. Gasanov, who is known mainly for his prize giveaways, a gimmick he seems to have borrowed from U.S. YouTubers like Mr. Beast, toured the country and was mobbed by crowds of fans along the way. At the end of his trip, Gasanov uploaded a video, produced by Mahmadzohir’s IM Group production company, speaking fulsomely about Tajikistan’s appeal as a destination. It has not been stated explicitly that Gasanov was paid for the visit, although it is probably safe to assume he was. But there is a political awkwardness to all this fanfare.

While President Rahmon, 70, has no cause to fear Mahmadzohir’s mounting profile, there is another person who might. It is widely assumed that Rahmon’s eldest son, Rustam Emomali, 35, is being primed to take over running the country at some point in the near future.

Emomali’s apprenticeship for this eventuality has been a decade in the making. Over the years, he has been rotated through jobs, from head of the customs service to chief of the anti-corruption service, and now a double role as mayor of Dushanbe and, much more significantly, chair of the upper house of parliament.

But unlike Mahmadzohir, Rustam is a dour and timid personality who eschews the limelight and appears ill-at-ease when required to attend public functions alongside his father. He has no social media presence.

The challenge from the younger upstart is not purely theoretical. Under changes to the constitution effected in a choreographed referendum in 2016, the age at which a candidate may run for presidential office was lowered from 35 to 30. It was assumed at the time this was being done to pave the way for Rustam’s imminent rise to office. But it so happens that Mahmadzohir will be 30 by the time the next scheduled vote comes around in 2027.

This may all be wild speculation, however. Some question the genuineness and depth of the popularity indicated by those Instagram figures. “I don’t think he has any political ambitions at the moment,” one political commentator who requested to remain anonymous. “For now, he is busy with amassing his business fortunes, including from lucrative trafficking of Afghan opium and heroin.  While most Tajiks live in abject poverty, and millions are forced to seek employment in Russia, Mahmadzohir flashes hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash in his videos as a message to his cronies and elite followers that he is the ‘Dollar King’, essentially mocking most Tajiks.”

Mahmadzohir’s untrammelled success as a Tajik influencer is thanks to a well-funded public relations team that not only produces drone videos of his galloping about the countryside on his exquisite steeds or pumping through the streets of Dushanbe in quarter million-dollar Ferraris and Bently’s, but that also manages four different Instagram accounts.

“Those people who would like to write something negative prefer to remain quiet, naturally. They understand that there is a level of risk in this even if the criticism is constructive,” the commentator said, noting the recent arrest of a prominent Tajik doctor and hospital director after he published a book alleging corrupt and dysfunctional practices.

Sure enough, what happens instead is that every time Mahmadzohir posts on Instagram, the replies are filled with praise, including from employees of the state broadcaster, university scholars, civil servants and the like.

In a rich field of competitors, the prize for main flatterer may go to state TV presenter Ulugbek Salimbekzoda, who took to Facebook in July to congratulate Mahmadzohir on his birthday.

“Masculinity and tenacity, gentleness and kindness, generosity and patience are among the least good qualities of our honorable Ismoil Mahmadzohir!” Salimbekzoda said in a post written in English, for reasons unclear. “He has love for the greatness of the seas, his heart is pure and peaceful like a river. We are proud of his presence on earth with all his love and sincerity.”

_{Above pictures: Ismoil Mahmadzohir and his horse collection
Source – https://youtu.be/JuIejW98grs, https://www.instagram.com/reel/CZEpTLzpth6}

Source

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Frankfurt (18/12 – 14)

That there are remarkable advantages in being ignored is not generally recognized. Central Asian countries, historically under the thumb of Moscow, all through the 70+ years of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, were more or less cut off from the outside world. There was little trade or other exchange.

The USSR was in fact a grab-bag of ethnicities, religions and languages, controlled with an iron fist by Stalin and afterwards with unbroken dominance through subsequent regimes.

Under Soviet management, Central Asia had stayed poor and ignored; it had not developed any hydrocarbon resources to lure western and European petro-buccaneers of the transatlantic Empire. With the sudden collapse of the USSR, renewed interest in the jigsaw puzzle of the various “-stans” arose in the west, partly in order to sniff out mineral resources of potential value – Kazakhstan has oil – but also in an effort to “contain” the newly-established “Russian Federation”, still a prickly opponent armed with ICBMs, and with tempting land and mineral resources. Western hegemony has steadily crept into Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, all Muslim, Turkic-speaking nations relieved to finally slip away from Russian domination.

“Hope Springs Eternal”, and there are western political figures and think-tankers who propose to bust up the Russian Federation into smaller, more malleable nations, docile ones easier to raid for tasty resources (such as was documented after 1991, when the Russian oligarchs conspired with western companies to steal everything that wasn’t nailed down). That the Russians themselves might not acquiesce in seeing their nation broken up and exploited is outrageous to the west, which considers the world its oyster (evidence: cheap extraction of resources from Africa & Latin America, with little profit for those who live there, with unbroken western hegemony).

The charming fantasy of breaking Russian military potential would allow Washington to fulfill its dreamy dream of “total spectrum dominance” (actual Pentagon term – not made up), having all but gutted the European economy through its quixotic Ukrainian adventure: destruction of the Nordstream 2 pipeline cut off the cheap Russian gas driving West European industry and consumer markets. Meanwhile, a sizable American military continues to occupy Germany, the UK and Japan.

The USA exacts tribute from its vassals through a negative trade balance and the relentless sale of Treasury Bonds, financial instruments whose intrinsic value becomes ever more questionable, and overpriced armaments.

With the Russians embroiled in the Ukrainian “Special Military Operation”, ostensibly to protect Russian-speaking areas under attack since 2014 by neo-Nazis, NATO saw an opportunity to beguile Central Asia, following the peaceful lead of the People’s Republic of China, whose “Belt & Road Initiative” has already made inroads, first in primitive Tajikistan and considerably more developed Kazakhstan.

China has also built the world’s longest oil pipeline, stretching from its oil fields in Kazakhstan over the Tien Shan mountain range separating it from Central Asia.

Now, the Americans, working through NATO and its usual-suspect NGOs, are attempting to tempt the Central Asian republics away from Russia, hoping that the traditional resentment of Soviet abuse and exploitation will draw them toward alliances with the west.

An example of Russian mistreatment: its nuclear weapons tests and space launches are being carried out in Kazakhstan.

One Andrei Serenko, Director of the Analytical Centre of the Russian Society of Political Scientists and head of the Centre for the Study of Afghan Politics, has warned that a resurgent terror movement, originating in brutal Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, poses threats to countries of Central Asia, primarily to Tajikistan. The Jamaat Ansarullah movement (also known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Tajikistan, or TTT, or the “Tajik Taliban”), has begun to train suicide bombers, consisting mainly of candidates from desperately-poor Tajikistan.

Jamaat Ansarullah is said to be based in the Afghan province of Badakhshan, bordering Tajikistan. In the past six months, according to Serenko, it has significantly expanded its ranks.

“If earlier the number of militants in this group was in the dozens, now it is in the hundreds,” wrote Serenko.

“Jamaat Ansarullah was able to solve problems with its financing, as well as with weapons—its militants gained access to modern American and NATO armaments left in Afghanistan in August 2021.” That was when the US and its allies, tails between their legs, ignominiously fled from Afghanistan, after a twenty-year slaughter and a failed twenty-one trillion dollar military adventure.

The Jamaat Ansarullah suicide bombers also originate from other post-Soviet countries; their training takes place in a special madrassa located in Nusay District (Darwaz-i-Bala) of Badakhshan Province.

Alexander Bortnikov, Director of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), has stated that “a “belt of instability” is being created on the “southern borders of the CIS”; Bortnikov reported that militants were being recruited from international terrorist organizations operating in Iraq, Syria and a number of other Asian and African countries, and were being transferred to northern Afghanistan.

A former Afghan spy chief claims that the Taliban regime now ruling Afghanistan is ambitiously exploring options to obtain tactical nuclear weapons.

Now we are talking. Suicide bombers are like mosquitoes in western society: they can cause damage but a SWAT team can just swat them away. Nuclear weaponry (including a simple-to-build “dirty bomb”) are another matter altogether. Even a small tactical nuke can take out a major part of a city – and drive the rest of the population to panic, thus ruining social cohesion and daily routines.

“The terrorists’ priority goal is to seize power in the countries of Central Asia, primarily in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and include them in the so-called ‘global caliphate’,” Bortnikov added, alleging that “this is being done with the active participation of American and British intelligence services.”

This would be no surprise, considering how the western military adventurers behaved in Iraq, Libya and Syria: sponsor, fund, then destroy. Rinse & repeat.

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The European Union and Aga Khan Foundation Partner for Rural Development in Tajikistan

High in the mountains of Central Asia, villagers can only dream of easy access to water for drinking and irrigation, as the river waters glisten in the snaking valleys below.  That dream is about to become a reality as the European Union and the private, not-for-profit Aga Khan Foundation team together to promote agricultural development and improve access to clean and safe drinking water in Tajikistan’s Zarafshonvalley, a region characterized by mountain ranges with peaks reaching 4,000 – 5,000 meters high. The EU and Aga Khan Foundation have provided €16.6 million to support the INVEST Rural Development Program, which aims to address the challenges faced by the residents of the Zarafshonvalley, one of the poorest regions in Central Asia.

Situated in the Sughd region of far western Tajikistan, the picturesque Zarafshon valley features a unique geography with one of Central Asia’s longest glaciers, and a history of human habitation going back far into antiquity. This topography presents significant challenges in terms of infrastructure development, access to essential resources, and agricultural productivity.

The INVEST Rural Development Program focuses on enhancing agricultural productivity, promoting sustainable land management practices, and improving access to essential resources such as water and energy. The program is designed to foster economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental sustainability in the region.

One of the primary challenges faced by the residents of the Zarafshon Valley is the lack of access to clean and safe drinking water. The region’s water resources are limited, and many households do not have direct access to reliable water supply systems. This issue is further exacerbated by aging infrastructure, the impacts of climate change, and the region’s mountainous terrain.

The Aga Khan Foundation has played an instrumental role in the implementation of the INVEST Rural Development Program, working closely with local communities and authorities to ensure the project’s success. The AKF has a long history of engagement in Central Asia, focusing on community-driven development initiatives that address the unique challenges faced by the region.

Drawing on AKF’s long-standing relationships with mountain communities through its Mountain Societies Development Support Programme, as well as the targeted expertise of the Aga Khan Agency for Habitat (AKAH) and Aga Khan Health Services (AKHS), the INVEST program will take a multi-sectoral approach to strengthen the sustainable management and protection of natural resources, boost food security and nutrition, and improve living standards. Through a partnership with a non-commercial, local cooperative, Sarob, the program will also provide specialized agricultural support. Together, the project aims to reach more than 380,000 people in Zarafshon Valley over five years.

Throughout the first year of the project, INVEST will introduce and implement a variety of locally led development activities, including forest and pastureland restoration, organizing permaculture activities for local schools, constructing greenhouses and chicken coops, distributing seeds, connecting homes with drinking water and building public toilets.

“The implementation of this project, covering more than €16.6 million, is a significant incentive for us to develop rural areas, in particular improving the living conditions of the population and the economic and social progress of the Zarafshon Valley,”Anwar Yakubi, Deputy Governor of the Sughd Province, said.

AKF, the EU, and partners will work closely with the Government of Tajikistan to implement the project, supporting its recent reforms in the agricultural and water sectors. Representatives from the government, AKF, AKAH, AKHS and the EU inaugurated the program on February 8, 2023 at the launch meeting in Dushanbe.  “The EU is honored to be working with the government in supporting national efforts towards developing the rural area and supporting agrarian reforms,” saidZulfiyaDavlatbekova, representative of the EU. “Increasing the performance of agriculture and building the resilience of rural populations will contribute to better incomes of the most vulnerable rural households, especially women and children. The European Union has provisioned €94 million in support to Tajikistan’s local communities, to be implemented in 2016-2025.”

Source : Asia-Plus

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Frankfurt (22/09 – 58.33)

Since May 2022, the Tajikistani authorities have stepped up their ongoing crackdown on Pamiris, an ethnic, linguistic and religious minority originating from the Pamir mountains in Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan. They have arbitrarily detained hundreds of Pamiris, including civil society activists and human rights defenders, and imprisoned over 200 of them after convictions in unfair trials, in a campaign aimed at stripping the local communities of their leadership and dismantling their civil society. 

The authorities must immediately and unconditionally release Pamiri civil society activists, journalists and human rights defenders who have been detained solely for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly. They must effectively investigate allegations of torture and other ill-treatment of people in custody. They must cease denying the Pamiris the rights to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own languages.

Tajikistan authorities have arbitrarily detained hundreds of Pamiris, including civil society activists and human rights defenders, and imprisoned over 200 of them after convictions in unfair trials, in a campaign aimed at stripping the local communities of their leadership and dismantling their civil society.

Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) is a high mountain region in the east of Tajikistan and officially had a population of 236,000 in 2018. The de jure autonomy of the region is enshrined in Art. 81-83 of Tajikistan’s Constitution, which entitles it to a local legislature merely with “the right of legislative initiative” and unspecified “powers … in social, economic, [and] cultural spheres of life … determined by a constitutional law”. Most of its ipopulation identify as ethnic Pamiris and adhere to the Ismaili branch of Shia Islam. They form ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities in the country. However, they are not recognized as ethnic and linguistic minorities by the state. The central authorities have been increasingly suppressing the use of Pamiri languages and the assertion of Pamiri identity in state institutions, schools, the media, artistic performances and public spaces, in violation of the right of minorities “to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, [and] to use their own language” enshrined in Art. 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They have also asserted tight state control over Ismaili religious practice like collective prayers and severely restricted religious freedom.

May 2022 and Ongoing Crackdown Against Pamiri Minority

Since May 2022, the Tajikistani authorities have stepped up their efforts to remove all vestiges of actual autonomy of the region and a crackdown on civil society in GBAO, violently dispersing protest events that were overwhelmingly peaceful or started as peaceful prior to their violent dispersal by government forces, and arbitrarily detaining individuals who disposed of informal authority or local influence, including civil society activists, journalists and human rights defenders. As well, they targeted individuals who had attempted to exercise their rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association by publicly voicing dissent in the context of protest events and in social media anytime in the past. According to a statement by the Inter-Agency Committee on Enforcement of Law and Order in GBAO on 17 June 2022, 220 persons had been detained in the framework of the so-called “special operation” which had started in mid-May 2022. Dozens or hundreds of further individuals were detained before and after the most intense phase of the crackdown. The news portal Pamir Inside (previously Pamir Daily News) listed the names of 205 convicted individuals in June 2023 whose cases had been made public or whose relatives had agreed to make public. Short-term arbitrary detention, including officially unacknowledged custody, for instance for the purpose of interrogation, was a mass phenomenon during the crackdown in May-June 2022 and has continued on a lesser scale since then. 

For example, one Pamiri man was detained by the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) during the most intense phase of the crackdown in summer 2022. He was taken to an SNCS office and interrogated about the protests in which he had taken part, and about community leaders and civil society activists with whom he was acquainted. The interrogating officer beat him, insulted him and denigrated him because of his ethnic and religious identity. After several hours, he was released. Shortly afterwards, he was summoned for interrogation by the Office of the Prosecutor. Once again, he was insulted and denigrated, but this time there was no physical violence. After a few weeks, he was interrogated once more by the SCNS. He left the country, fearing that one of the security agencies could detain and prosecute him anytime. 

Respected community figures among the Pamiri diaspora, political activists and other dissenters were forcibly returned or secretly renditioned from the Russian Federation in cooperation with Russian security services, and detained immediately after arrival in Tajikistan. In the months following May 2022, many Pamiris in Russia who expressed political dissent or volunteered in the framework of community activities of the Pamiri diaspora, were informally threatened with forcible return by members of the Tajikistani or Russian security services. Many Pamiri refugees have been at risk of deportation from a number of countries in Europe and elsewhere where they were seeking international protection. Back in Tajikistan, many family members of Pamiri refugees have been repeatedly visited by and threatened by the Tajik security services about the whereabouts of their family members overseas. Countries forcibly returning Pamiris to Tajikistan are breaching the principle of non-refoulement, a cornerstone of international human rights and refugee law, which prohibits the transfer of anyone to a place where they could be exposed to persecution or other serious human rights violations. Pamiris forcibly returned to Tajikistan are at risk of arbitrary detention, torture and other ill-treatment, enforced disappearance and unfair trials. 

The risks for Tajikistani citizens targeted by the authorities and forcibly returned to Tajikistan are evident in the case of Abdullohi Shamsiddin. In spite of multiple warnings about the risk of detention and torture in Tajikistan, on 18 January 2023, Germany deported him to Tajikistan. He is an ethnic Tajik and closely related to several leaders of the oppositional Party of Islamic Revival of Tajikistan. After arrival in Tajikistan, he was subjected to enforced disappearance and then reportedly held in solitary confinement by the SCNS. On 29 March 2023, a court in Dushanbe reportedly convicted Abdullohi Shamsiddin on charges of “public calls for the violent change of the constitutional order of the Republic of Tajikistan” under Article 307 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to seven years in prison. 

Amnesty International has conducted interviews with two individuals who had been interrogated by various security agencies during or after the crackdown in May 2022 but were not arrested and could leave the country, and with five individuals who had been detained or interrogated before May 2022. Almost all interlocutors, who spoke on conditions of strict anonymity, reported verbal abuse during interrogation which did not only target the interrogated person, but also their female relatives, ethnic Pamiris and their Ismaili religious community. Many interlocutors reported physical violence during interrogation as well, includ beating with fists, batons and metallic devices, electric shocks and sleep deprivation. According to interlocutors who had been subjected to torture and other ill-treatment, it had mostly been aimed at extracting information from them and forcing them to incriminate themselves and others. With few exceptions, those who were arbitrarily arrested and officially remanded in detention during and after the crackdown in May 2022 were convicted in unfair trials, many of them under unfounded charges of participating in organized criminal groups (Art. 187 of the Criminal Code15). The Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on Combating Terrorism (Art. 4) defines crimes under Art. 187 of the Criminal Code as crimes of “terrorist” character and in such cases allows closed trials (Art. 18). UN experts have recently expressed concern about the potential negative impact of this overly broad definition of terrorism on due process. 

Pamiris detained during and after the crackdown in May 2022 were often convicted in such closed trials and in many cases did not have access to a lawyer. In particular, the trials of human rights defenders were described as unfair by many observers, as no evidence of credible charges was publicly presented. Sentences were extraordinarily harsh, which is reflected in the high number (11) of sentences to life imprisonment. UN experts have addressed the cases of human rights defenders Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, Manuchekhr Kholiknazarov, Faromuz Irgashov and Khushruz Jumaev.

For example, Commission 44 was an informal group of individuals formed in November 2021 in Khorugh to monitor the investigation into an alleged extra-judicial execution and lethal violence against protesters and to intermediate between the authorities and the population in GBAO. Several respected Pamiri lawyers and civil society representatives joined Commission 44. During the May 2022 crackdown, its most prominent members were arbitrarily detained. They were convicted and sentenced after the Supreme Court of Tajikistan arbitrarily labelled Commission 44 a “criminal organization”. Faromuz Irgashov, a lawyer who had tried to register as a non-party candidate for the 2020 presidential elections, was sentenced to 29 years in prison for alleged participation in a criminal group, murder, terrorism and organization of activities of an extremist organization. Manuchehr Kholiknazarov, also a lawyer, the director of the Lawyers Association of Pamir and a member of the NGO Coalition against Torture and Impunity in Tajikistan, was sentenced to 16 years in prison for alleged participation in a criminal group and organization of activities of an extremist organization; and the Lawyers Association of Pamir was closed by the authorities for alleged links to organized criminal groups. Addressing the alleged arbitrary detention of Irgashov, Kholiknazarov and others, UN experts in a joint communication to the Government of Tajikistan in May 2023 expressed “serious concerns about the apparent pattern of using extremism- and terrorism-related charges against human rights defenders and minority activists, particularly those defending the rights of the Pamiri minority, allegedly to discredit them and justify further secrecy around their cases.” 

Several international non-governmental organizations, including Human Rights Watch, the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR), CIVICUS and others, have called for Kholiknazarov’s immediate and unconditional realease, raising concerns about the sharp deterioration of the environment for human rights defenders and civil society activists in recent years.

Recommendations The Tajikistani authorities must respect the human rights of all persons in Tajikistan, and in particular end immediately reprisals against Pamiri activists and other dissenting voices. All Pamiri human rights defenders, other civil society activists, journalists, community leaders and others, who have been arbitrarily detained and imprisoned solely for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, must be immediately and unconditionally released.

All allegations of torture and other ill-treatment of people in custody must be effectively investigated, and all suspects must be brought to account in fair trial proceedings. All victims of human rights violations in Tajikistan should receive full and adequate reparations for the damage suffered. 

Members of the Pamiri communities should be able to fully enjoy their economic, social and cultural, as well as civil and political rights. 

The reported widespread discrimination against Pamiris, particularly in the criminal justice system, must be effectively, independently and impartially investigated. All laws, policies and practices that may be discriminatory should be independently examined, and all necessary measures taken to ensure that these are fully compliant with Tajikistan’s international human rights obligations, including by repealing or amending the relevant legislation, abolishing relevant policies and ending relevant practices, and monitoring the actions of state officials. All victims of discrimination should have access to effective, transparent and accessible remedies. 

The international community should monitor and report on human rights violations in Tajikistan, including in GBAO. International and regional organizations and Tajikistan’s other international partners, including national governments, should raise these violations at every opportunity, including in multi- and bi-lateral fora, and actively seek an end to these violations and take steps to provide remedy for their victims. 

All states should respect the principle of non-refoulement and must not forcibly returning individuals from GBAO to Tajikistan or to any third country such as Russia, where they would be at risk of forcible transfer to Tajikistan, where in turn they could be victims of human rights violations, including arbitrary arrest and prosecution, torture and other ill-treatment, and unfair trials.

Source: Amnesty International

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The escalation of geopolitical tensions linked to the Ukrainian crisis has highlighted two main opposing camps of countries — an Alliance of Democracies on one side and a Group of Authoritarian Regimes on the other. A number of countries have resisted choosing sides, however, as they strive to balance their national interests with international developments while simultaneously advocating the need to maintain peaceful diplomacy and global connections.

While the number of these so-called “in-between” countries abound (particularly in Latin America, Africa, and South and Central Asia), only a few of them have upheld an outspoken commitment to the principles of multilateralism and non-violence. One of these is Kazakhstan, which, through its rhetoric and actions, has consistently demonstrated a commitment to international principles enshrined in the UN Charter despite severe challenges to the country’s economy and stability brought on by recent global developments. Impressively, Kazakhstan’s strong compliance with economic sanctions imposed by Western countries against Russia has stood the test of time.

Amid a slew of destabilizing events including a violent coup attempt in January 2022 and an ongoing international crisis embroiling its neighbor Russia, Kazakhstan has taken important steps towards strengthening democracy and stability at home such as limiting presidential powers, fighting oligopolies and recovering assets stolen from the country by cronies of the old regime. Kazakhstan has also maintained its commitments to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and has contributed to energy and food security in Europe.

Last year, in a public discussion with Vladimir Putin at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, President Tokayev made it very clear that his country remained committed to the UN principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. “Kazakhstan recognizes neither Taiwan, nor Kosovo, nor South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This principle will be applied to quasi-state entities, which, in our opinion, are Luhansk and Donetsk,” the President sad. Such position of Kazakhstan has been vocal and proved by consistency in voting pattern on UN Ukraine-related resolutions.

Kazakhstan has taken important steps towards strengthening democracy and stability at home, such as limiting presidential powers, fighting oligopolies and recovering assets stolen from the country by cronies of the old regime.

Still, such persistent dedication to international democratic principles (by a relatively weaker country squeezed in a geopolitical triangle with two much-stronger neighbors, i.e. China and Russia) has not been enough to alter a seemingly entrenched negative opinion of Kazakhstan. With an especially strong viewpoint particularly in the West, under the banner of “human rights”, oligarchs can bait international NGOs and the media into believing their proxy political figures are victims of authoritarian abuse. When every decision taken by Kazakhstan courts against these local proxies is criticized, their oligarchic overlords gain enormous leverage at the expense of damaging Kazakhstan’s international credibility and reputation, as well as undermining its fledgling process of democracy building.

One such case involves a Kazakhstani citizen Zhanbolat Mamai, who was sentenced in September 2017 to a three-year suspended sentence for the theft and embezzlement of funds. Considered an independent journalist and a political activist, Mamai allegedly violated Kazakhstan’s law again and has been charged for insulting a government representative (under Kazakhstan’s Criminal Code, Article 378), spreading false information (under Article 274), and organizing illegal protests (under Article 488). Amnesty International has called this decision an “act of retribution” by the government. However, Amnesty’s coverage of the Mamai case tells only half the story.

Charged with illegal actions, Mamai has subsequently positioned himself as a persecuted human rights defender. He has received financial and political support from Mukhtar Ablyazov, who stole billions of dollars from a Kazakhstan bank and then fled the country. Ablyazov has already lost various court cases in the United States, Great Britain and France. Mamai has allegedly used Ablyazov’s money to run an unregistered political party called the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan.

Nonetheless, the above facets of the Mamai case are sometimes not taken into consideration by human rights organizations.

It is also worth noting that Mamai is not in prison (as stipulated by Articles 378 and 274) but has instead received a suspended sentence.

The fact that not all sides are taken into consideration is now facing a backlash in Kazakhstan. Local NGOs are questioning whether the motivations behind attacking Kazakhstan over these high[1]profile cases are truly about human rights. In the meantime, the government is implementing reforms to address the everyday concerns of Kazakhstani people, including protecting their social welfare, healthcare and financial prospects.

The difficult balancing act that Kazakhstan’s government is trying to manage in both its international and domestic affairs faces many challenges. But credit should be given where it’s due. In this environment, Western NGOs and media falling prey to tactics by the beneficiaries of the old Kazakhstan regime only hurt the country’s nascent democratization process and its efforts to break from authoritarianism and corruption still widespread elsewhere in Central Asia.

Luc Rodehefer is a foreign policy expert and a freelance financial analyst. A former banker, he is currently based in France and covers political and economic relations between the EU and emerging markets.

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Led by authoritarian head of state since the 1990s, a regime change for the people in Tajikistan might take a while.

In any case, changes and growth often take too long. Especially when we are talking about the change of a commanding ruling power in the country. History recorded that power shifts happened due to factors not necessarily through any kind of violent revolution. One key factor that influences such power shifts is the role of the army in the country.

Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon seems unshakeable in his presidential seat, at least till the year 2027. Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Tajikistan was unable to improve its status as Central Asia poorest country since the dissolution of Soviet Union. The country’s Gross Domestic product (GDP) and its military strength remain the lowest amongst its neighbors. Additionally, the human rights issues and civil liberties index for Tajikistan kept deteriorating since 2013.

Tajikistan has been dominated politically since 1992 by President Rahmon and his supporters. The government has historically obstructed political pluralism eventhough the constitution provides for a multiparty political system. In a 2016 national referendum, constitutional amendments approved and outlawed religious-affiliated political parties and also abolished presidential term limits for the “leader of the nation”, a title that has only been held by the incumbent. Thus, allowing President Rahmon to further solidify his rule. Following his father’s footsteps, it seems that next in line is Rahmon’s 34-year-old son, Rustam Emomali. Rustam is the oldest of nine offspring and the presumed successor to the presidency.

“Since 1992, Tajikistan has been dominated politically by President Emomali Rahmon. In a 2016 national referendum, constitutional amendments approved and outlawed religious-affiliated political parties and abolished presidential term limits for the “leader of the nation”, a title that has only been held by the President Rahmon.”

Human Rights Watch reported that “Tajikistan’s human rights record continues to deteriorate amid an ongoing crackdown on freedom of expression and the political opposition, as well as the targeting of independent lawyers, journalists, and even the family members of opposition activists abroad.”

Under President Rahmon’s ruling, the Pamiris are experiencing decades of repression in their homeland in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO). The Dushanbe government insistently accuses the Pamiris to be involved in acts of extremism and separatism against the government. There was a constant onslaught of assaults and human rights violations on the Pamiris, including persecutions, detention, convictions, torture and sadly for some, reports of murder.

It is indeed unfortunate and somewhat fatal for Tajikistan and its people how President Rahmon’s regime act towards the voice of improvement.  

Mary Lawlor, United Nations Special Rapporteur for human rights defenders, cited that there is limited understanding of the concept of human rights defenders in Tajikistan. She reported and objected that Tajikistan authorities are labelling human rights defenders as extremists, terrorists and/or foreign agents.

“I also heard with sadness that being considered a human rights defender often carries a negative connotation, and some members of civil society even avoid being referred to as defenders,” Lawlor said in December 2022 after she visited the country.

Urgent Structural Reform  

How Dushanbe regime responded to its protracted internal conflicts is in reverse to what the world sees its neighbor, Kazakhstan. After Kazakh’s nationwide unrest in January 2022, President Kassym–Jomart Tokayev immediately vows for structural reform. Aiming for ‘New Kazakhstan’, President Tokayev not only progressively and consistently move towards implementing economic reforms, but also made changes in bureaucratic policies and politics. He stripped the old authorities in his government of political privileges, including his predecessor former president Nursultan Nazarbayev.

The Kazakh president announced that, “The era of oligarchic capitalism in Kazakhstan is ending as the country is entering an era of greater social responsibility to its citizens. Our citizens need an efficient and socially responsible business that occupies a leading position in the country’s economy.”

President Tokayev is fully aware that Kazakhstan has everything to lose if the country fails to stay relevant as Central Asia’s richest. Thus, he implemented such urgent, open and transparent reforms to maintain his country’s reputation. This mindset rewarded Tokayev his second presidential term in a snap election in November 2022.

President Rahmon on the other hand, chose to remain the same after decades of decadences. As BTI Transformation Index writes on its Tajikistan 2022 report, “Tajikistan is a consolidated authoritarian state which enjoys a complete monopoly on the use of force over its entire territory.”

While his neighbors were busy tasking and developing their countries, Rahmon however believes that progress can be achieved by demanding it instead of earning it through collaboration and cooperation. His viral reaction to Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 14 at a summit of leaders from the former Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana, somewhat showed his leadership style.

A video of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon complaining to Russian President Vladimir Putin about his lack of respect for the countries of Central Asia that were once part of the Soviet Union has struck a nerve on social media, where it has been viewed millions of times. Rahmon, then addressing Putin directly, said that Tajikistan and other countries in the vast region have been treated like outsiders and indicates that the region deserves more investment from Moscow. Putin appears uncomfortable in the seven-minute video posted on YouTube, where it has been viewed around 4 million times. The video also also shows the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan looking on silently.

Temur Umarov of Carnegie Politika interpreted Rahmon’s actions as the Tajikistan wanting to emphasize its loyalty towards Russia but now they are ‘isolated’ because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Umarov wrote on Twitter, “Rahmon wants to play his card right. At this point, he invested a lot to keep [Russian] influence high in [Tajikistan] and did much less than other [Central Asian] states to diversify its ties [with] partners besides Russia. Now, Rahmon wants to be rewarded.”

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Climate change is a global issue that affects many regions of the world, including Central Asia. The region is experiencing unprecedented climate crisis, causing significant changes to the region’s environment and affecting local populations, economies, and ecosystems. In recent years, climate change in the region was associated with rising annual temperatures, prolonged drought, melting glaciers, intense heatwaves, reduced snow cover, as well as increased frequency of natural disasters.

Central Asia has experienced a significant increase in temperature in recent years, with average temperatures rising by 1-2 degrees Celsius over the past century. This has led to an increase in drought, affecting agricultural production and putting food security at risk. Scientists have found that since the late 1980s, desert areas in the region have expanded eastward, and have spread north by as much as 100 kilometers in northern Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, in southern Kazakhstan, and around the Junggar Basin in northwestern China. The World Bank’s latest assessment suggests that climate change could force 216 million people globally to migrate within their own countries by 2050.

Due to various factors, in Central Asia the climate crisis is not receiving as much attention as in other regions. Central Asia is not always in the headlines and does not receive as much media coverage, which makes it more difficult for people to learn about the impacts of climate change. In addition, countries in the region face a range of challenges, such as poverty, political instability, and economic development, which may take priority over addressing the challenges posed by climate change. In addition, Central Asian states have limited financial and institutional resources to invest in climate change mitigation and adaptation. This can make it more difficult for them to receive international attention and support. 

Despite the growing threat posed by climate change, there is limited awareness among the public, research community, and decision-makers in the region about the impacts of climate change and the need for action to mitigate and adapt to these impacts. A recent study showed that out of 13,488 journal articles in eight major journals focusing on Central Asia, only 33 articles (0.24 percent) were on climate change or a related topic.

Although some refer to climate change as an “accelerant” for global  cooperation, at the same time it poses significant social, political, and geopolitical challenges in Central Asia, as the region is highly vulnerable to its effects, including water scarcity, food insecurity, and increased frequency of natural disasters. The climate crisis will further exacerbate existing political tensions, particularly over water resources, as countries compete for access to limited supplies. It is also affecting the stability of fragile states and increasing the risk of conflict and cross-border migration. 

Central Asia is facing a serious water scarcity crisis due to the impacts of climate change. The region is largely dependent on snow and glacier melt from the Himalayas and the Pamirs for its water supplies, but rising temperatures are causing these ice formations to melt faster, ultimately leading to declining water levels in rivers and lakes. At the same time, increasing evaporation due to higher temperatures is reducing the availability of surface water. These changes are putting significant pressure on the region’s agricultural sector and increasing the risk of conflict over access to water.

Food insecurity is another major concern in Central Asia as a result of climate change. The region is facing declining crop yields due to water scarcity, increased frequency of natural disasters such as droughts and floods, and soil degradation due to increased salinity and desertification. These factors are making it more difficult for farmers to produce enough food to meet the region’s needs, leading to food shortages and price spikes.

One recent example of food insecurity in Central Asia is the situation in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, where a combination of abnormal winter temperatures, poor preparation, and soil degradation led local governments to ban food exports. The countries are heavily dependent on agriculture, and the impacts of food insecurity are affecting the livelihoods of millions of people and increasing the risk of social and political instability. Based on modest global climate projections, it can be concluded that the harsh winter of 2023 in Central Asia may serve as an example of what a typical winter will be like in 2043.ADVERTISEMENT

Central Asia is also facing an increased frequency of natural disasters as a result of climate change, which is causing significant damage to infrastructure, disrupting economic activities, and affecting the livelihoods of millions of people. The region is witnessing an unprecedented number of annual floods, droughts, and landslides. One recent example of increased frequency of natural disasters in Central Asia is the situation in Kyrgyzstan, which has been hit by a series of floods and landslides in recent years. In 2019, the country was affected by severe flooding that caused significant damage to infrastructure and disrupted economic activities. The same year, a series of landslides caused by heavy rains affected communities and infrastructure, leading to loss of life and displacement of people.

Despite prevalent climate skepticism in Central Asia, it is clear that the issue cannot be ignored. In the short run, the governments of Central Asia should take action to mitigate the effects of climate change. First, governments should develop and implement comprehensive adaptation plans to help communities and key economic sectors, such as agriculture, energy, and water management, prepare for and respond to the impacts of climate change.

Second, governments should invest in upgrading existing infrastructure, such as dams, levees, and irrigation systems, to reduce the risk of damage from extreme weather events and ensure that critical infrastructure is resilient to the impacts of climate change.

Third, governments can support farmers in adopting sustainable agricultural practices that are better suited to the changing climate and can help to increase crop yields and improve food security.

Fourth, the local governments should prioritize the development of integrated water management plans that promote sustainable water use and reduce the risk of water scarcity and conflict over shared water resources. Other actions should focus on disaster risk reduction, investing in renewable energy, and capacity building. 

There are a number of steps that the governments of Central Asia must take to mitigate the effects of climate change in the long term. The first step is a transition to low-carbon energy. Central Asian governments need to support the transition to low-carbon energy sources, such as wind, solar, and hydropower, and phase out the use of fossil fuels. This will help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and slow the pace of climate change on a global level.

Second, governments can also implement measures to improve energy efficiency in buildings, transportation, and industry. This will help to reduce energy demand and lower greenhouse gas emissions.

Third, the governments will need to work to protect and restore ecosystems, such as forests, wetlands, and grasslands, which play a critical role in regulating the climate and preserving biodiversity. By implementing these types of initiatives, the governments of Central Asia could reduce the risks posed by climate change and promote long-term sustainability and resilience in the region.

Regional cooperation can play a critical role in tackling climate change in Central Asia. By working together, countries in the region can leverage their collective resources, knowledge, and experience to address the challenges posed by a changing climate. However, one should also stay realistic about the obstacles to regional cooperation, especially when addressing the challenges posed by climate change in Central Asia. 

Regional cooperation may be complicated by political and economic interests (such as disputes over water and energy resources), new conflicts (such as the Russian aggression against Ukraine), and competition for regional influence. These interests can make it difficult for countries to work together effectively to address the challenges posed by climate change. Also, trust between countries in the region can be limited, which can make it difficult for them to work together on regional cooperation initiatives. Building trust between countries is essential for regional cooperation to be effective in addressing the challenges posed by climate change.

Countries in the region face a range of challenges, including limited financial resources, which can make it difficult to invest in the measures needed to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change. To effectively address the challenges posed by climate change, countries will need to find ways to secure sufficient funding and resources.

source: thediploma

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Since its construction in 2015, the Urumqi International Land Port Area has launched 21 rail routes accessing 19 countries and regions in Europe and Asia, with over 200 categories of goods carried by the trains.

source: news.cgtn

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